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Abstract:  This paper provides a game model for examining the host overseas investment policy and 
MNEs equity strategy in international joint ventures. This paper refines previous Chen 
and Chung’s (2008) results and considers the host policy about MNEs’ joint-venture. 
This paper shows foreign firms increase their technology transfer incentive because 
less competition from the joint-venture partner when a foreign firm holds lower shares. 
And the holding shares of foreign firms must be not smaller than 50 percent. The host 
welfare increases with foreign firms’ minority equity. The equity conflict exists in the 
higher technology spillover and transfer cost cases. Hence, the host governments always 
impose investment restrictions on MNEs in the Developing countries. Otherwise, it has 
more loose policy in the Developed countries. 
i. iNTrODuCTiON
Since the 1980s many less developed countries (LDCs) have been pursuing a policy of domestic 
liberalization. One of the goals behind such policies is to attract foreign multinational enterprises 
(MNEs). Katrak (1981) examines a host country’s commercial policy towards a multinational 
firm that has formed a joint venture (JV) with a local firm. And Chowdury and Chowdury 
(2002) also show that many LDCs are actively trying to promote joint ventures as a vehicle for 
such foreign participation. The joint-venture law of China not only encourages foreign firms to 
sell their products outside China, but also promotes local participation of equity of MNEs. The 
rate of joint venture formation in the LDCs has increased dramatically in the last three decades. 
Many studies have shown that joint venture is formed because of government regulation in 
developing countries.1 These countries expect to benefit from technology spillovers through 
the shared equity. This is why we say that international joint venture is the most fascinating 
development in the international business. Many scholars point out MNEs tend to use shared 
equity mode as the first step into foreign market, especially when they face higher political and 
economic risk in host countries (Harrigan 1988) 
1  For instance, Beamish (1985), Janger (1980) and Tomlinson (1971) all support the discourse about joint ventures 
were formed because of government regulation in developing countries with empirical data. Mukherjee and 
Sengupta (2001) also show that the threshold into developing countries is the liberation for shareholdings.shArEd Equity Policy in Joint VEnturEs for host countriEs
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Generally, most MNEs carefully plan the entry mode before engaging in overseas investment. 
The ownership structure is the priority issue to deal with. Lecraw (1984) states that positive 
relationship existing between technology capacity and foreign ownership. Padmanabhan and 
Cho (1996) gather observations from Japanese enterprises and find that the more expenses 
on r&D (research and development), the higher foreign ownership there would be. For the 
problem of technology grab, many enterprises prefer adopting a higher ownership strategy. 
Numerous theses about entry strategy for MNEs show that the more severe free-rider problem 
a host country has the more likely the decrease on technology transfer will be. Therefore, 
MNEs prefer adopting direct entry or higher ownership to avoid the technology transfer grab. 
However, an opposite result is found that higher ownership for a foreign firm does not have 
a positive effect on the incentive of transferring technology in our joint venture entry mode 
and Cournot competition construction. 
in order to merge into host country and enter the foreign market easily, MNEs will choose 
the appropriate partner and optimal ownership. Most of the papers regarding JVs ownership 
structure usually stress the importance on characteristic of foreign firms or the host markets; 
however, less emphasis has been placed on concerning competition conditions between foreign 
and host firms. And the host welfare of joint venture formation has received relatively little 
theoretical attention. (One exception is Chowdury and Chowdury (2002) who examine the 
welfare implication of joint venture considering the cost symmetry.) in this paper we make a 
three-stage game model in analyzing the optimal ownership for MNEs and the host welfare 
of joint venture between MNEs and host firms. 
This paper concentrates on ownership structure for the JV parties and considers the 
optimal equity policy for host welfare. When the restrictions on MNEs shares ratio from 
host government are removed, it means the ceilings on foreign firm’s equity are withdrawn 
in liberalization. Many developing countries remove foreign investment restraint to attract 
technology inflow in droves. MNEs are not forced to release shares to host firms anymore. 
Thus, this paper attempts to solve the optimal shares ratio of MNEs and develop an optimal 
equity policy for host country under this liberation trend. Many literatures indicate JV mode 
can benefit the developing countries in promoting technology. Thus, this work adds technology 
spillover for joint venture partner into our model.2 Furthermore, we analyze the host welfare 
and try to find out the optimal host policy in international joint ventures. 
Chowdury and Chowdury (2001) provide a dynamic JV life cycle, allow the Cournot – 
Competition between JV partner and foreign firm and they emphasize the joint ventures on 
production factors. Chen and Chung (2008) also use Cournot – Competition to analyze the 
optimal equity for MNEs. But they have never yet considered about the host position. This 
paper will think over the equity structure on joint venture entry mode for MNEs and host 
countries by taking account of the cooperation and competition role for joint venture partner. 
This paper finds equity conflict between MNEs and host countries. And the conflict is 
increasing with higher technology spillover and transfer cost. How to construct the foreign 
investment policy for attracting MNEs’ entry and technology transfer to increase host welfare 
is the important guiding principle for host governments. 
2  Chung (2006), inkpen (2000) and Hamel (1991) use empirical data to support the better technology advantage 
for joint venture partner in joint ventures mode.mEi-fAng chung
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section ii outlines the basic model. in section 
iii the optimality of ownership, technology transfer and the products are established. Section 
iV analyzes the optimal equity policy for host welfare. Section V provides concluding remark. 
ii. THE MODEL
This paper follows Chen and Chung’s (2008) model and considers optimal host equity policy 
in international joint venture. There are n domestic firms, a foreign firm (denoted as f) tries 
to enter the market of this host country by inviting a domestic partner (which is one of the 
n domestic firms and is denoted as h) to build a joint venture (denoted as j). We assume that 
the foreign firm holds a share of ownership a of the joint venture and the domestic partner 
(h) owns 1-a share.3 The foreign firm is assumed to have a higher technology in production 
so as to produce at a relatively lower production cost. However, the introduction of the new 
technology into the host country will stimulate or spill over to the domestic partner and yield 
changes of the market competition.
The entry game proceeds as follows. in the first stage, the foreign firm determines its 
shares ratio a ( 0<a≤1), and gives 1-a to the cooperative partner at a lump-sum transfer V.4 
After resolving its shareholding, the foreign firm chooses the level of technology transfer 
(x) to the joint venture firm at the second stage. Technology transfer lowers the marginal 
production cost at the third stage but it is a costly process. The transferred technology x of the 
foreign firm incurs a technology transfer cost C(x) and will lower the marginal production cost 
of the joint venture to c-x. Assume that the cost of technology transfer is C(x) =tx2/2 where 
t = πx2C/∂2x determines the convexity of the function and denotes the efficiency of technology 
transfer. A higher t represents a higher transfer cost for a same level of technology transfer. 
The new technology in the joint venture will spill over to the domestic partner, which can 
therefore reduce its marginal cost of own firm by bx, 0≤b≤1. The parameter b is the measure 
of technology spillover to the domestic partner.5 We assume that the spillover degree (b) is 
exogenous as the argument of Muller and Schnitzer (2006) and Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1999) 
claim.6 Moreover, the technology spillover benefits only the partner of the joint venture. At 
the last stage, the foreign firm f (which owns a shares of the joint venture firm), the domestic 
partner h (which runs its own firm and owns 1-a shares of the joint venture j), and all the other 
n-1domestic firms (each denoted as i, i = 1, …., n-1) compete in a Cournot competition, in 
which outputs qf, qh, and qi are determined, respectively. The perfect equilibrium of this game 
is found by solving backwards.
Assume that the inverse demand function is p(q) = a – q, where q = qh+qf+  The 
profit function of individual firm is given by: 
3  To remain the control of the joint venture, the foreign will only release a share less than 50% to the domestic 
partner. Therefore, the joint venture firm will be under the foreign firm’s control (Mowery 1992, Gong 2004) 
4  This lump-sum transfer is decided by the bargaining power of JV two parties. 
5  Harris and Holmstrom (1982) firstly argues r&D coordination leads to the free rider problem in JVs research, 
it means technology will have spillover effect. 
6  Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1999) state that local participation in JV facilitates spillover and the degree of foreign 
ownership does not affect its extent; Muller and Schnitzer (2006) show the spillover degree is affected by the 





The pj denotes the profit of the joint venture firm of which a proportion belongs to the foreign 
firm and 1-a proportion goes to the domestic partner, as shown in equation (1) and (2). 
iii. MODEL ANALySiS
3.1 Product Market
Given the entry mode and ensuing technology transfer, firms choose output levels to maximize 




  (6) 
Lemma 1. The third-stage equilibrium outputs exhibit the following properties: (1) ∂qf /∂a 
<0, ∂qh/∂a >0, and ∂qi/∂a <0. (2) ∂qf/∂b <0, ∂qh/∂b > 0, and ∂qi/∂b < 0. (3) ∂qf/∂x > 0, ∂qh/∂x 
> 0 if a+b>1, and ∂qi/∂x < 0. (4) ∂qf/∂n < 0, ∂qh/∂n < 0, and ∂qi/∂n < 0.
Proof. 
∂qf /∂a = – [(a-c)+(n+1-b)x] / (n+1+a)2 < 0, ∂qi / ∂a = – [(a-c)+(n+1-b)x] / (n+1+a)2 < 0, 
∂qh /∂a = {(n+1)(a-c)+[n(n+2-b)+(1-b)]x} / (n+1+a)2 > 0,
∂qf /∂b = – x / (n+1+a) < 0, ∂qh /∂b = (n+1) x / (n+1+a) > 0, 
∂qi /∂b = – x / (n+1+a) < 0, ∂qf /∂x = (n+1-b) / (n+1+a) > 0, 
∂qh /∂x = [n(a+b-1)+(b-1)] / (n+1+a) > 0, if a+b > 1,
∂qi /∂x = -(a+b) / (n+1+a) < 0, ∂qf / ∂n = -[(a-c)-(a+ b)x] / (n+1+a)2 < 0, 
∂qh /∂n = – a[(a-c)-(a+ b)x] / (n+1+a)2 < 0, ∂qi /∂n = – [(a-c)-(a+ b)x] / (n+1+a)2 < 0. 
3.2 Technology Transfer
in the second stage, given the foreign firm’s shares holding and expecting the third-stage 
equilibrium outputs as in equation (4), (5), and (6), the foreign firm chooses the level of 
technology transfer to maximize its profit. We can write the firm’s first-order condition for 
technology transfer as: 
  (7)mEi-fAng chung
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Using equation (7) and Lemma (1), we can obtain the optimal technology transfer 
function: 
  (8)
For the existence of technology, we need: t > 2(n+1-b)2/(n+1+a)2. Since qf, qh and qi must be 
greater than zero to keep firms in the market by Eq. (4),(5),(6) and (8), we need 
 if a+b≥1.   if a+b<1.  (9)
Lemma 2. When the foreign firm’s shareholding of the joint venture or the technology 
spillover degree is higher, the foreign firm will decrease its technology transfer. When 
the number of firms in the host market increases, the technology transfer of foreign firms 
increases if the cost of technology transfer t ∈ (τ,  ), but it decreases 
if t >  .
Proof. Taking derivative with respect to equation (8), we obtain: 
 < 0,
 if t > 2(n+1-b)2 /[(n+1+a)(n+1-a-2b)]. 
in an economic sense, when t is sufficiently large, technology transfer becomes much more 
expensive (and therefore the foreign firm has lower incentive to transfer technology), resulting 
in less profit of the foreign firm under a more competing market. Nevertheless, when transfer 
cost turns out to be sufficiently low, the effective transfer process would increase the transfer 
incentive to take advantage of the cheap cost reduction. 
3.3 Shares Ratio Strategy
When forming joint ventures, how many shares should be sold to the domestic partner is the 
MNE’s first-step for maximizing its profit. it maximizes equation (1) with respect to shares 
ratio (a), given the expectation of equation (4), (5), (6) and (8), we obtain equation (10). The 
first term (pj) is the direct firm f’s incentive for shareholding. The higher firm j’s revenue leads 
firm f’s preference, and it represents the scale effect of shareholding with respect to a (denoted 
as EEa), at the same time, firm f must absorb technology transfer cost (tx2/2). The first term 
(∂pj/∂a) in the bracket is zero. The second term (∂pj/∂qh×∂qh/∂a) in the bracket captures the shArEd Equity Policy in Joint VEnturEs for host countriEs
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partner strategic effect of shareholding (PSEa). PSEa should be negative because an increase 
in firm f’s shareholding enhances firm h’s output and harms firm j’s profit. The third term 
((n-1)×∂pj/∂qi× ∂qi/∂a), termed as the strategy effect of shareholding (SEa ) should be positive 
because of strategic substitution (∂pj/∂qi<0).
  (10)
Therefore, applying Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, equation (10) can be rewritten as Eq. (11): 
  (11)
where 
The LHS of equation (11) is the marginal revenue of a (denoted as Mra), and the rHS is the 
marginal cost (denoted as MCa). 
 
                               –3α)τ] > 0.   (12)
This implies that the marginal profit of foreign firm increases as b and will induce higher 
shareholdings. 
in mathematics of equation (11), we find that the downscale of MCa
 due to t again 
dominates the Mra effect. mEi-fAng chung
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                               –3α)τ]> 0.  (13)
Therefore, this implies that the marginal profit of foreign firm increases as t and will induce 
higher shareholdings. 
By equation (11), we obtain the optimal shares ratio for the foreign firm: 
.
  (14)
The superscript * of a denotes the equilibrium. For the Eq.(9) requirement, we can get 
0.5≤a* ≤ 1.7 The result consists with many countries’ foreign investment law (Mowery, 1992; 
Gong, 2004). Since ∂a* /∂t >0 and ∂2a* /∂t2 < 0, the optimal shares ratio is concave in t.8. 
Considering Eq.(9) and the range of a, we can get the corollary about the limit of transfer 
cost (t) as following:
Corollary:
(1) if a+b≥1, 
(2) if a+b<1, 
Lemma 3. A foreign firm’s shareholding increases with higher technology spillover degree or 
higher transfer cost, And the foreign firm’s shareholding must be greater than 50%. 
Proof. Taking derivative with respect to equation (14), we obtain: 
Higher spillover degree (i.e., higher b) gives domestic joint venture partner firm higher free-
riding benefit, and reduce the marginal revenue for holding higher shares. Nevertheless, less 
technology transfer leads smaller marginal cost for higher shareholdings in higher b. The 
advantage from decreased technology transfer cost is larger than the inferiority from reducing 
marginal revenue. Therefore, the foreign firm will prefer holds more shares to evade spillover 
risk. When cost of technology transfer is higher, a higher shares foreign firm does not have 
chance to increase marginal revenue through technology transfer advantage. However, higher 
t leads smaller marginal cost for holding shares. it will encourage the foreign firm to increase 
its shareholding for higher profit. This result is consistent with Chung’s (2006), which re-
examine the ownership in Sino-foreign joint venture after China’s WTO accession and find 
7  See Appendix 1. And this result refines Chen and Chung’s (2008) findings.
8  ∂2a*/∂t2 = -[(n+1-b)2/t4]{2t (n+1-b)2 [(n+1)2-2(n+1-b)2/t]-1/2+(n+1-b)2[(n+1)2-2(n+1-b)2/t]-3/2}<0.shArEd Equity Policy in Joint VEnturEs for host countriEs
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that the higher shareholding, even wholly foreign owned mode, will be the preferred strategy 
when the MNEs face markets with little capital and a higher transfer costs. On the other 
hand, in the highly developed markets like America and the European Continent, the cost of 
technology transfer is relatively lower, which leads the foreign firms to hold smaller shares 
to reduce competition.
 The number of firms in market also has effect on foreign firm’s shares ratio. 
                               .  (15)
Above equation is greater than zero when t is sufficiently large.
From Equation (15), the marginal revenue curve of a with high n1 (denoted as curve 
Mra(n1)) has single crossing with the marginal revenue curve of a with low n2 (represented 
as Mra(n2)), and the marginal cost of a, denoted as MCa(t1) and MCa(t2) with t1 > t2. Then 
the equilibrium shares ratio shows to be lower under higher market competition (as Mra(n1) 
in the Figure 1.), when the cost of technology transfer is sufficiently cheap (as MCa(t2) in 
the Figure1.). 
, if t< 2(n+1-b)/(n+1). 
Lemma 4. When the number of firms in the host market increases, the foreign firm’s equilibrium 
shares ratio decreases if the marginal cost of technology transfer t ∈ (
' t ,  ) and (
" t ,  ), but it increases if t >  .
in an economic sense, if t is low enough (technology transfer is higher efficiency), the 
more competitive market magnify the shareholdings influence on output of firm f and firm 
h, it means lower PSEa and larger EEa with n. Consequently, the foreign firm is inclined to 
sell more shares to firm h and transfer more technology when entering the more competitive 
market. Take the cost advantage from higher technology transfer to get over adverse factor 
of competition. in contrast, higher ownership policy is adopted in situations involving higher 
transfer costs and a more competitive host market. This result coincides with the entry strategy 
of numerous MNEs. MNEs are happy to release shares in low transfer cost markets like Europe 
(Shetty 1979). On the contrary, MNEs have a preference for higher ownership strategies when 
entering the competitive China market and transfer less technology (Business in China, 2004). 
Because selling shares to reduce market competition in a highly competitive market has little 
effect.9 Combining Lemma 3 and 4, we build the following Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: A MNE adopts a higher equity strategy, transfer less technology and have reduced 
output capacity when entering host markets characterized by high technology spillover, low 
technology transfer efficiency and high competitiveness. 
9  ∂ (∂qf/∂α)/∂n = [2(α-c)+(n+1-α-2ß)x]/(n+1+α)3>0.mEi-fAng chung
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iV. HOST COuNTry EquiTy POLiCy
The investment policy by host government plays an important role in economic growth for 
developed and developing countries. MNE maximizes Eq. (1) by setting the optimal equity 
level, but the question of which equity policy most benefits host welfare remains unclear. 
To analyze the welfare of host country (HC), we follow Hillman’s (1982) approach to form 
welfare function as W (p, CS), which consists of domestic firm’s profits [ph+(n-1)pi] and net 
consumer surplus (CS).10 The host welfare is calculated and summarized as the following:
W = πh + (n – 1)πi + CS
 
(16) 
The government maximizes political support by choosing a shares ratio that maximizes the 
welfare function,11
  (17)
Through mathematics, it reveals that higher consumer surplus and lower profit of domestic 
firms from higher ownership of foreign firms. The negative firms’ profit effects dominate the 
positive consumer surplus effect, and thus higher shares ratio (a) is associated with lower host 
welfare. Hence, host countries prefer the MNEs’ minority equity. Higher MNEs’ ownership 
10  We assume that W[×] is well-behaved, ie.,  , WCS > 0, Wππ < 0, WCSCS < 0.
11  See Appendix 2.
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damages host welfare is consistent with the ownership ceiling for foreign firm entry in 
developing countries by Beamish (1985) and Teng et al (2001).12 As Beamish (1988, p. 17) 
writes, “The most common reason cited for a multinational taking a minority equity position 
were existing regulations and/or local tax advantage.” 
However, in ownership liberalization, MNEs can determine their preferred equity ownership, 
therefore, equity conflicts exist between MNEs and host countries (HCs). Host governments 
hope minority-equity for foreign firms to benefit their welfare more. However, MNEs prefer 
majority-equity in the higher transfer cost and technology spillover cases (from Proposition 
1). Even MNEs want to enter the host market as WFOEs (wholly foreign owned enterprise) 
under the b =1case. Enormous conflict exists between the preferred shares levels of MNEs 
and host governments. The equity conflicts between MNEs and HCs increase with transfer 
cost and technology spillover degree.
The lower shares ratio of foreign firms induces higher technology transfer and higher host 
welfare. This work reveals that technology transfer not only provides higher local consumer 
surplus but also provides the joint venture partner with an opportunity to gain cost advantage 
through technology spillover and share the profits generated by the formation of the joint 
venture. Although the other host firms will be harmed by the higher level of technology, but 
the positive effects dominate the negative one. Consequently, HCs prefer higher technology 
introduction because it benefits national welfare more. This finding matches that of Takarada 
(2006), who concludes that technology transfer benefits the recipient country.
if the policy measures of the HCs are considered, Figure 2 shows the optimal shares ratio 
for MNEs and HCs. We find the HC has a stronger incentive to require MNEs to release their 
shares. The preference divergence of shares ratio between MNEs and host country is larger 
with higher transfer cost. MNEs prefer holding higher shares under higher t, however, host 
country hope MNEs releasing more shares. Even, wholly- foreign-owned will be the choice 
for MNEs under perfect spillover case (b=1). 
V. CONCLuSiONS
in this paper i developed a model for analyzing the optimal equity strategy for Multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) and host countries. it finds that the results are critically dependent on the 
environment of host countries.
 in the three-stage and three-style firms game model, higher shareholding of MNEs leads 
to a decrease in technology transfer which is found in more competitive host market with 
higher technology transfer cost and spillover environment. The analyses is similar with Chen 
and Chung (2008), furthermore, i get a demonstration that MNEs will hold shares larger than 
50 percent and have stronger control force on joint venture firm. This result is analogous to 
Buckley et al (2004), Thompson (2003) and Wong (2001) which show that foreign firms are 
not willing to transfer technology into JV to avoid the risk of technology spillover. And the 
lower technology transfer is unfavorable for host welfare. The minority-equity and higher 
technology transfer from MNEs is the preference for host welfare. 
12  Teng et al (2001) conclude that a host country may set ceiling on ownership to maximize its national welfare. mEi-fAng chung
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The host legal regime has an effect on the foreign investment. The incentive of technology 
transfer will decline when foreign firm exposes the risk of no perfect irP (intellectual right 
Protection). This coincides with the high spillover degree, and a higher ownership for MNEs 
will result. Teece (1998) suggested that whether a technology transfer is successful in a host 
country may depend on the local legal integrity. it has shown that joint venture firm’s higher 
technology introduction benefits the host welfare. it means lower host welfare resulting from 
higher technology spillover and transfer cost. How to build the preferred environment for 
foreign investment is the important policy program for developing countries. 
The forces of globalization appear to have diminished the use of shared ownership (Desai, 
Foley, 2002). But host countries are eager for the shared equity and higher technology transfer to 
benefit their economic growth and welfare. in our model, the host country prefers foreign firm’s 
minority-equity conclusion is consistent with previous studies and many developing countries. 
Only protecting the irP and declining the host transfer cost can benefit the host welfare. 
Figure 2: The Foreign Firm’s Shares ratio for MNEs and Host Country
Notes: Simulations are performed within the space of (1.2, 0.4) ≤ (t , a) ≤ (2.18, 1), the MNEs’ optimal equity 
from Eq. (14) and the host welfare simulation from Appendix 3. Line a** is the expected MNE’s shares ratio for 
maximizing host country welfare under given b. Line a* is the MNE’s expected shares ratio for maximizing its 
profit. The subscript of a* and a** represent the given different technology spillover (b).
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Since MNEs will adopt the majority holdings and it leads the equity conflict between 
MNEs and host countries. How to give incentives and attract foreign investment will be an 
important and difficult task for host government. 
APPENDix




   
and get b
is 0.5. The minimum a* occurs at a* = b = 0.5.












The minimum a* is 0.5.
A2. The Welfare Variation from Shareholding Ratio
 Through simulation, we find dW/da <0.
(a)   ( from Lemma 1.)
(b) 
      
From simulation, we find the host joint venture partner’s profit decreases with a.mEi-fAng chung
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(c) 
      
      CS = q2/2, 
A3. The Host Welfare
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